Documents | International Religious Liberty Association

The Journal of the International Religious Liberty Association
1998 Fides et Libertas

Bishop of Oslo

Oslo, Norway

Is it possible to speak of the Nordic nations as pluralistic societies? What are the real issues of religious freedom in these countries, each of which has a state church system? How is religious freedom understood today? Is there one Nordic perspective? Although I have a Nordic perspective in mind, my views do reflect my Norwegian base, which in itself is an assertion that it is possible to have a common Nordic perspective from any one of the five countries comprising Scandinavia.

This article is divided into three parts. First, I wish to discuss the Nordic state church issue. This is the most unifying and commanding historical perspective on religious freedom in a Nordic context. This is often, especially from outside, seen as the very core of the issue of religious freedom in this region. Since a state church system is viewed critically within the membership of the International Religious Liberty Association and regarded to be in contradiction to the IRLA’s position on separation of church and state, I believe this point deserves major attention. Then I want to discuss which factors are working for or against the status quo. Commenting on the source of possible future changes, I will focus on the role of the “free churches” (the label used for all the traditional Christian churches outside the state church, i.e., the churches which are “free” from the state), the new religious movements, and the historical old religions (Islam, for example, which is relatively new to Scandinavia). Third, I will offer some recent empirical material illustrating the growth of privatization and secularization as dominant features of the so-called post-modern society and indicate possible consequences of the struggle for religious freedom at the beginning of a new millennium.

These observations are to be seen as a modest contribution to a discussion which has only begun on what could be a Nordic perspective on, and contribution to, the understanding of the complexity and importance of religious freedom fifty years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This discussion is especially needed in the Nordic region where religious freedom, compared with other human rights issues, has been a low-profile item on the national and international political agenda. Let me emphasize at the outset that religious freedom is becoming an ever more important issue, understood as both freedom of and freedom from religion. The religious freedom scenario in the Nordic countries is shifting under the impact of secularization and the strengthened presence of adherents of other living faiths. First, it is a shift from relationships between Christian churches to a relationship among religions, and second, a shift to the relationship between these two groups and a secular, non-religious culture.

I. Like-minded nations

Historically, the five Nordic nations--Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden--have been understood to be anything but pluralistic societies. In terms of culture, language, economy, social order, and religion, they form a rather unified corner of the world. Within the United Nations the Nordic countries are often referred to as “like-minded nations,” a reference to their humanitarian concern and their commitment to human rights, development, peace, and justice.

Behind an overall image of unity, there are, of course, national differences. Some of these are due to varying degrees of rootedness in centuries of continental Europe. In recent times new differences have developed in their particular relationships to the continent of Europe. Traditionally, Denmark and Sweden have been seen as more continental in terms of history and culture. Finland’s geocultural and geopolitical situation, through its proximity to Russia, offers a Byzantine element, virtually absent in the other Nordic countries. And while all the other Nordic countries have established Lutheranism as the official religion, Finland has two state churches: Lutheran and Orthodox, the latter connected to the patriarchate in Istanbul.

Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes communicate comfortably with each other in their native languages. Finns use Swedish and Icelanders Danish to participate in the free-flowing Nordic dialogue. Whether it is the existing union in culture and values or the underlying national differences that have made it impossible to form a formal union of some sort is difficult to say. The Nordic Council meets annually to discuss common interests over a wide range of affairs, but it has little impact on day to day politics. It serves more to cement an existing unity than to create binding structures.

Historically, Iceland and Norway are the least integrated into continental European culture, traditions, and structures. This is no less true today: Finland and Sweden have followed Denmark in becoming members of the European Union, while, by popular choice, Iceland and Norway have remained outside. This option for an economic and international future outside membership in the EU does not necessarily reflect any anti-Europe bias, as some critics claim; nor does it reflect a general position against what might be perceived as Roman Catholic influence within the European Union, although such arguments have been voiced in the debate.

Norway shares with the other Nordic nations a high degree of consciousness of its Nordic and European heritage and its regional and global commitments within such systems as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Council, each of which has important human rights aspects. All Nordic countries are active members of the United Nations and are parties to all its basic human rights and religious freedom conventions.

The state church system

The state church system is so central to the constitutions of the Nordic countries and so massive in membership that in this region we speak of a state religion. Scandinavia thus constitutes a last--if not a lasting--bastion of the established Protestant church. (England’s Church of England is similarly established.) In the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic worlds, various arrangements of church and state on a more or less similar formula continue to be unchallenged.

To fully appreciate the situation today, we look back briefly. In all the Nordic countries the Lutheran Reformation was victorious in the 16th century and ever since has been the strongest force in shaping religious history on the principle cuius regio, eius religio. The faith of the sovereign became the faith of the nation. The head of the state is the head of the church. Indeed, the secular history of each of the Nordic nations is intertwined with its church history and vice versa. Accordingly, Nordic church history of the past five hundred years is to a large extent, if not exclusively, Lutheran history--history reflecting the dictum that the victor writes the history.

Religious freedom in the modern sense came late to these shores. Norway’s Constitution of 1814, which established the Lutheran faith as the religion of the state, barred both Jews and Jesuits from the realm, a blot that took more than a century to be totally erased. As other Protestant churches and movements gradually became a reality, Norway’s national attitude to them was more hospitable. By 1845 Norway adopted a “Dissenter Law,” legalizing the existence and activity of non-Lutheran Christian churches.

On the 150th anniversary of the dissenter law in 1995, church historian Berge Furre addressed the issue at stake: “Maybe freedom of religion is the most important of all civil freedoms and rights--freedom to search and find one’s identity, to find oneself. Finally it is this freedom that decides the rise and fall of human worth.” Poignantly expressing the cutting edge of the discussion on religious freedom in Scandinavia today, Prof. Burre concluded his speech with these words: “Let this not be the last time we celebrate the memory of a step towards freedom of religion. Maybe the next celebration for religious freedom in this country will be a multicultural celebration.” The emphasis is mine--and I support Furre’s vision.

The state church system has undergone gradual changes from within--changes primarily in the shape of the governance of the state. This has had implications for the rule of the church. An important point in the evolution of the church-state relationship was the introduction of the Parliament in the 19th century. The king became the titular and symbolic head of both state and church. Real political power was transferred to the government which had to reflect the will of the Parliament and, by the same token, subscribe to the programs of political parties.

The sovereign acts with and through the cabinet. This implies that in real terms it is the cabinet or government that is the ruler of the nation and therefore of the church. In Norway the majority of cabinet ministers, but not necessarily the prime minister, must hold membership in the Church of Norway. Only those holding such membership may vote when the cabinet meets on matters directly related to the church, such as appointments of bishops and other clergy and adoption of ordinances regulating church life. Parliament votes the church’s laws and annual budget. In this larger legislative body, however, membership in the Church of Norway is not a question. A Muslim member of Parliament would vote on church laws and budgets along with other parliamentarians who are members of the state church, members of other churches, or, perhaps, atheists.

The head of state in each of the Nordic nations--in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the king or the queen; in Finland and Iceland, the president--must be a member of the state church. A church-affairs prerogative of the sovereign is maintained in Denmark and Norway. Certain areas of decision not subject to Parliament are dealt with by the king or the queen who acts according to the counsel of the government.

Democracy and consensus

The state church is so much part and parcel of the state that it must be understood in the context of the Nordic democratic system, and in the context of a political culture which itself is rather homogenous. The persuasiveness of this political mono-culture is often expressed somewhat jokingly between political adversaries: “We are all social democrats.” Under whatever ideological flag, the majority of the political parties continues to support the state church system. In none of the countries would a unilateral break be politically feasible. Not only would a broad political consensus be needed to bring about new legislation, which in fact would be to change the very Constitution of the country, but, to make this politically viable, a broad base of support would have to be found among the rank and file of the membership of the church and within the structures of the church. We are therefore speaking about a long term evolution rather than abrupt and sudden changes.

Sweden will be the first to break the ranks of established churches in Scandinavia. An agreement has been reached between the state and the Church of Sweden, leading to a synodical and parliamentary decision to disestablish by 2000. This does not imply, however, that the former state church will be reduced to the level of all other churches in the kingdom. At home and abroad, the archbishop of the Church of Sweden will still be seen as the archbishop of Sweden.

The process in Sweden is indicative of the fact that legislation and economy have intertwined church and state to the extent that one cannot be excised from the other without a process based on consensus. Also, the centuries-old role of the state church as the vehicle of religious traditions and functions in civil society makes a unilaterally decided

change impossible. In this case, it truly may be said that a happy divorce is possible only between two consenting partners.

The only exception to separation by mutual consent would be a situation of massive violation of human rights and religious freedom as was the case during World War II, when the majority of bishops, clergy, and lay leaders of the Church of Norway broke with the Nazi government. It was the legitimate church that suspended relations with an illegitimate state. However, as soon as the war was over the relationship was reestablished. (It may be of interest to note here that since then futile attempts have been made to raise the issue of abortion to the same level of status confessionis in the Norwegian church.)

What is the situation in the other Nordic countries? In Finland, there is a process underway for new laws to be passed for both the Lutheran Church of Finland and the Orthodox Church of Finland. But this is not interpreted as a radical change in Finland’s form of the state church system, which so far has been the least state-dominated system among the Nordic nations.

In Norway in 1996 a church law passed by Parliament crowns years of reform by giving the synodical church leadership more responsibility through decentralization of important elements of church government to diocesan levels, including the appointment of ministers and other administrative personnel. But the very principle of a state church was hardly challenged in this legislative process, neither by the church nor the politicians.

However, in 1997 a proposal by one of the bishops in Norway’s Ministry of Church Affairs, that a committee should be appointed to review the whole state church system, was turned down by the ministry, with support from a great majority of the political parties. In fact, the idea did not meet with much enthusiasm in the Bishops Council either. Later, however, the synodical Church Council appointed its own committee with a more open mandate.

If this committee is to bring any new dynamic to the issue, I believe it must base its claim to change on new factors, other than those considered during the last fifty years. It must face in a new, creative, and positive way the multi-religious and multi-cultural realities which are gradually reshaping Norwegian society. And it must interpret the role of the church much more clearly in a global, ecumenical, and religious-freedom context, than has hitherto been the case when discussing church and state in Norway. In other words, if this new initiative is to bear positive fruits we must move into a new agenda of church-state issues in a spirit which takes into account an increasingly pluralistic and a more distinct secular society, where claims on state church privileges belong to the past.

Neither in Denmark nor in Iceland are there processes presently underway to change the state church system. In all Nordic countries the issue of religious instruction in the public school system regularly raises a state-church, religious-freedom debate. Following a heated debate in the public arena and in Parliament, Norway passed new legislation in 1997. A coalition comprising free churches, the secular humanist movement, and Jewish and Muslim communities rallied against the state-church political establishment to stop what the coalition perceived as an incursion on religious freedom. The new legislation attempts to create culturally-based religious and moral instruction in the public school system, albeit with a preferential emphasis on the Lutheran confession, but with an introduction to all major faiths. In the first proposal, there was no possibility for children to be exempted from religious instruction. In the process language was introduced to meet some of the concerns of the opposing coalition. But in my view the new law does not fully take into account the arguments of religious freedom, nor the legitimate need for the Lutheran church to instruct its own children. I believe, therefore, that in the not too distant future this issue will have to be revisited by Parliament, and that a virtual separation of school and church may come before separation of church and state. Any church which falters on the religious instruction of its own children and youth is bound to face decline.

The folk church

In spite of the striking features of the state church system in the Nordic countries, the deeper identity of the churches is not found in their church-ness, but in their relationship to the majority of the people. It is generally assumed that it is the identification of the majority of the people with Christian faith in the Lutheran tradition and the moral values of the church that form the raison d’etre of the state church. What then, when erosion is afoot, of faith and traditional values?

In a post-modern society, the general trend towards secularization (which I will discuss below) does not necessarily work against the close relation of church and state. Rather, the opposite may be the case. A more and more secularized population may actually be more comfortable with a church that is somehow managed by the political powers and thus indirectly by the people themselves.

At the same time, the role of folk churches (be they state churches or not) as the bearers of society’s religious traditions, also becomes more problematic in an increasingly pluralistic society. The religious census--and consensus--may change so radically that no longer can any church claim a whole nation as its own, and no state can afford to regard one single church as the sole official bearer of its spiritual values, its honors and shames, its joys and griefs. Among the active church membership, there has always been a considerable force which sees the state church system as the best theological expression of the freedom offered in the Gospel for all--worthy and unworthy alike--to be included in the kingdom of grace. Those in this force tend to see the system as a protection of religious freedom--understood in this instance as free access for everyone to the church and to the services of the church. This, I believe, is the most important point for many Scandinavians: the open church or the folk church. Yes, one might even say the democratic church. The state is seen only as an instrument to make secure the church’s ability to function as the folk church. Others would maintain that there is a sine qua non: without the link to the state there is no folk church. Personally, I believe that if the continuity of the folk church polity and spirituality could be guaranteed, there would be a greater readiness by the people in general to forego the state church system.

There are those who see in the folk church model a more culturally and socially open church rather than one which they fear might be relegated to the status of a religious subculture. This may be illustrated by a recent heated discussion in the Danish press. It centered on what is termed the “privatization” of the church, as opposed to the state church as a peoples’ church and as a public church. Defenders of the system saw it as the guarantor of the peoples’ voice in a “public church,” something which gives the church a legitimate place in the public arena, and which gives the church a voice which cannot be ignored in political discussions on religious and moral issues, exactly because it is the state church, the church of the people. Others contended that it is precisely in the interest of the critical prophetic role of the church that it must leave its comfortable cohabitation with the state.

Discussions in the Nordic countries on the relationship between church, state, and people belong to every generation, from 19th century Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard onwards. It may be safely said today that a large majority, including even those who support the system, see the state church system as an anachronism. No one would “invent” the state church today. And very few responsible church leaders or politicians would guarantee the prolongation of the present form of state church relations for more than another generation. This does not necessarily mean that a post-modern society is rushing towards its abolition. Anachronism has by definition a gift of longevity--and nostalgia sometimes serves as its vitamin. My guess is that the Lutheran folk church will survive the Lutheran state church in all the Nordic countries. This certainly does not imply that a solution would be found along the line of the principle of absolute separation of church and state.

Facing international conventions on religious freedom

It should be noted that the state church system has not been found by any of the international conventions, such as the European Human Rights Convention, to violate any article on religious freedom. Darby v. Sweden (1990) elicited this opinion: “A state church system cannot itself be considered to violate Article 9 of the Convention [the article on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion]. . . . However, a state church system must, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 9, include specific safeguards for the individual’s freedom of religion. . . .”

Cases of religious freedom which have been brought to court on a national or an international level have been very few in number. Not one has disclosed fundamental dissatisfaction with the state church system. The European Human Rights Court’s regular review of the human rights standards and performance of member states has, in the case of Norway, brought up for discussion the issue of the state church and its implications for religious freedom, but with no recorded criticism.

This positive appraisal may be due in part to a very advanced body of legislation of equal rights for all citizens which permeates the total legislation of the Nordic nations. But it may also rest upon the liberal system of official recognition as well as the generous financial support of all duly registered churches or communities of faith. In Norway the financial support per member of a registered church is equal to the level of state support for each member of the Church of Norway. The only difference is that in the case of the Church of Norway Parliament disposes of the finances of the church, while the other communities of faith receive the money for their own stewardship. In Finland there has long been a system of economic self-rule by the state churches, and with recent reforms, Sweden is strengthening this trend.

While there exists in the Nordic countries a broad and generous attitude of accepting churches and communities alongside the state church, a difference is maintained in terms of public functions on behalf of the state. Denmark has stopped giving a certain form of official recognition to more churches simply out of civil administration concerns, as this has to do with the right of the church, on behalf of the state, to register births and deaths and to perform marriages. Although the difference between recognized and registered churches is one of terminology, this issue has caused considerable debate in Denmark. It is not perceived as something positive to be labeled a non-recognized church even when recognition does not make a difference. The Danish Ministry of Church Affairs is promising a solution that meets the complaints of discrimination. This notwithstanding, the matter of authorization of churches to conduct rites and ceremonies connected with life and death, and to act juridically in these areas on behalf of society, is one of the most complex and sensitive issues in a multi-religious environment. In this area related to the issue of religious freedom we will no doubt face new controversies in the Nordic countries in the coming years. Just consider the difficulties of legislating which names may be used as proper names and family names by way of illustrating the great cultural differences between, for instance, Christian and Muslim traditions.

II. Changes, yes--but from where?

To a certain extent, the influx of new religious entities into the traditionally homogenous societies of Scandinavia is bound to unsettle the historic balance, and disturb the more or less harmonious, century-and-a-half old modus vivendi between the state church and the other churches. Likewise, the feeling of inferiority of most of the traditional free churches has been reduced as their visibility in the public arena has increased, along with the slow but gradual strengthening of their ecumenical commitment. Now minority status is felt most acutely by the new religious communities over against a majority culture which more often than not includes all the traditional Christian churches. Note should also be taken of a new situation where the traditional free churches are affected by the way, for instance, the Islamic ummah appears in the religious arena. At present there are in Oslo close to thirty mosques which are administered by the same legislation as the free churches. In Oslo an amount of 33 million kroner--approximately six million dollars US--is paid out annually to registered communities of faith without any satisfactory control. While there exists a certain transparency and a culture of recognized accountability within the free churches and the Jewish community, this is not yet obvious in the Muslim and Hindu communities. The per capita subsidy from the state is paid out according to the statistical statement of the community itself. Now is heard from public administration and from political groups a demand for an internal register of every community receiving state support and stricter control to account for the taxpayers’ money.

There exists today no general rule on the registration of members, nor are there any criteria for what may be registered as a community of faith, save only that the entity does not violate national law and public moral values.

Concerning the present role of the free churches as possible agents for change in the state church relationship, it may be argued that in the Nordic countries church-state separation has never been a broad, grassroots movement, notwithstanding that the free churches not only offer spiritual alternatives to the faith of the state church, but also present a different ethos and a distinct critical position on the church-state issue inherent in their spirituality and piety.

But this is not to suggest the possibility of shifts in membership from the state church to the free churches. In fact, the ratio is fairly constant. State church membership hovers around or just above 90% in all Nordic countries. Even so, the voices of the free churches will be increasingly important to the life of the state church. The free churches have joined together in ecumenical structures that include the state church. The congregations are working together for Bible-based causes and for international diaconia.

What then of the so-called “new religious movements,” which in some ways may be seen as the free church generation of the 21st century? These newcomers to the Nordic religious universe are mostly small groups of charismatic pietists under authoritarian, prophetic leadership. Aggressive in growth and eager for publicity, some of the groups present themselves as rather fundamentalist, with little or no interest in social issues. They are often perceived as strident counter-cultural movements in matters central to the social-democratic ethos so dominant in the civil society of Scandinavia. In the public arena, they are seldom vocal in the discussion of religious freedom. They may, however, have a potential for raising the importance of the issues of religious freedom and freedom of conscience precisely because they represent a minority with distinctly different religious characteristics. This should not be ignored in mapping out the religious freedom issues of the future.

The 80s and 90s saw an upsurge in the number of movements inspired by the “new age,” but these have not normally sought formal recognition as churches or religious entities. Some of these new movements draw on the spiritual resources of other living faiths far from Nordic shores. This is in many way one of the lasting legacies of the generation of the 60s which, in revolt against all establishments, turned also against the institutionalized church. Their search for an alternative spirituality often ended with gurus of the East.

It goes without saying that these movements proselytize among the membership of the state church. But in contrast to the situation in other regions with dominant churches, such proselytism is seldom, if ever, attacked or even resented by the state church rank and file, although they are the likeliest target and the most vulnerable.

The 90s have seen the emergence of small groups devoted to Satanism. They are notorious for their burning of churches, particularly in Norway. Additionally, organized groups identifying with pre-Christian pagan religions of the Viking era have come to the fore. Some are seeking official recognition as church bodies. With success, they invoke the principle of freedom of religion and claim the financial support of the state.

None of these developments is of such impact as to constitute a serious challenge to the status quo. But they have given new impetus to an emerging discussion on freedom of religion in which the issue of the state church may gradually become more important to all. But the discussion does not necessarily have the tone of more religious freedom, but rather the contrary.

Living faiths and secular society

In terms of religious freedom, I believe two factors are emerging as the strongest catalysts for change in the Nordic religious arena: increasing secularization on the one hand and, on the other, the rising number of adherents of other living faiths, mostly among immigrants. I believe these will greatly affect, if not totally reshape, the Nordic religious geography into the next century. Accordingly, the most burning issue of religious freedom will be the formulation of legislation able to reconcile post-modern secular society and traditionally Nordic Christian people with the increasing number of faithfully practicing Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims. These have come to stay and to become citizens with full and equal rights. I am pleased to state that there still exists a great readiness on the part of the majority of Scandinavians to welcome these new citizens and to see it as something positive that a multi-cultural and multi-religious society is emerging. To the majority, pluralism is not at all a threat. However, the poison of hatred, of xenophobia, and outright neo-Nazism is creeping up from the dark and evil abyss of human nature resident also in the Nordic nations, and this is being exploited politically by the extreme right. The emergence of such racist attitudes is in itself a matter for any discussion on tolerance and the protection of religious freedom.

But it is not the extremists but the uninformed who today account for the most frequent occurrences of stereotyping, misunderstanding, and mistreating of people of other faiths. To encounter other living faiths may create a cultural shock. In this light I see one of the most publicized religious freedom cases in Denmark. It involved the recent expulsion of a Muslim from a state-run education facility because of prayer. This official agency of the Danish Ministry of Works refused to allow a student enrolled in a public continuing-education course to pray to Allah during the breakfast break. The facility directed the young Muslim to use the men’s room for his prayers. The student insisted that he would perform his religious duty in the corridor outside the canteen. The facility director defended his attitude by claiming he acted in the best interests of the Muslim in that his prayers provoked other students. In explaining his decision to the press, the director had the gall to refer to Christ’s admonition not to pray in public but in private. This matter was taken to court in Copenhagen--and followed with great interest by human rights groups as well as churches, synagogues, and mosques. It would bring little honor to any state to argue before the European Human Rights Court that it is in keeping with respect for religious freedom to deny a Muslim the performance of prayers according to Islam and that offering him a toilet for his devotional exercise is an expression of tolerance.

This unfortunate incident is more than an individual fault. It is indicative of a cultural watershed. When the public prayer of a Muslim is regarded as disturbing, even a provocation, it is a sign suggesting that the greatest challenge to future secularization in the Nordic region may not stem from the state churches, nor from the free churches, but rather from adherents of other living faiths. The influx of Muslims in the larger cities poses, in my view, the sharpest challenge to a weak religious movement and a secularized population. A committed and well-regulated spiritual life confronts secular environment and diluted Christianity.

III. A closer look at secularization and privatization

I believe the “Christian-ness” of the Nordic nations is sometimes overstated, other times grossly underrated. What then is truth and what is myth about secularization in Scandinavia? There is no easy answer. There are, however, a growing number of empirical studies in Europe in general and within each of the Nordic countries. These studies are enlightening.

A major “European Values Study” of 1990, which encompassed Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, reveals that participation in the services of the church, including baptism, marriage, and burial, is rapidly decreasing, even if a majority still hold them to be important. There are differences between and even within each of the Nordic countries, but these are insignificant to the overall impression of growing secularization.

This trend is also documented in a “Belief and Values in Sweden in the Nineties” (1996), a major study by Kallenberg, Brakenhjelm, and Larsson. The study population numbered 2,003 individuals. They were polled as to faith and values according to five categories: church Christians, church spirituals, private spirituals, agnostics, and atheists. Adherents to other living faiths were not included. It seems likely, however, that those identifying with the new religious movements were defined as private spirituals, the category for those who believe “there exists some sort of spirit or source of life.” The project results support the generally held notion that there exists in the Nordic countries an increasingly strong trend to secularization. There were surprisingly few--only 15%--who identified with a concept of God central to Christian faith (that is, faith in God as a person), while 35% responded that there exists a sort of spirit or power of life. (One observes that in the European Values Study, the average for some of the largest countries was 33%, compared to Sweden, 15%; Denmark, 24%; Norway, 29%; and Finland, 32%.)

Susan Sundback, a Finnish sociologist of religion, reviewed the same material from a different aspect, contending that it is important to differentiate between religion in a subjective sense and religion in the sense of a community as expressed in an institution. People may have a positive attitude to God, but not to the church as an institution--and vice versa: “The main comparative study of the meaning of religion among Scandinavians resulted in two ranking lists. The first list describes the meaning of religion on the subjective level and gives the following order: Icelanders, Finns, Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes. The second list, which expresses opinion about the church as a social institution, places the nations somewhat differently: Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark” (Sundback, 1994).

Iceland, Norway, and Finland rotate on the positive side of the scale, while Sweden and Denmark score low on both the subjective and institutional scales. These two countries have been ranked as the most secularized in the world.

This material bears out that the changing religious map of the Nordic countries is in fact most strongly affected by secularization and privatization, and that this is most clearly observed inside the established churches. Individualism leads inescapably to secularization, and secularization breeds privatization of values. Both imply a growing distance of the majority of the people from the institutions of church and society.

A study by Swedish scholar T. Pettersson affirms the general trend in Europe towards individualization and privatization. He notes that of these two processes, individualization is primary: “Individual self-realization and well-being is given priority partly at the expense of such duties and engagements which previously have been dominant features of a family life and of social life in general. . . . This individualism leads more or less to secularization, which means that an increasing number of the population feel distanced from church and society, and that a reduced number of the population accepts basic Christian tenets” (Pettersson, 1992, p. 51).

In my own international work I have often met people, officials of both state and church, who have had difficulties reconciling their image of the Nordic countries as Christian nations with the reluctance of Scandinavian politicians and diplomats to express positive attitudes to religious faith and to relate their values to the religions of their nations. I may be mistaken, but I believe there is a new trend emerging--a growing understanding for the need to affirm the value of values and the basis of values when addressing the human issues of the future. It is perplexing if this emerges at a time when secularization is increasing. Or does the weakened role of institutions of religion offer a greater space for individuals to articulate religious values without the risk of being co-opted by the state church or misinterpreted as being on “a religious mission”? Could it be that the post-modern society sets people free to affirm religiously based values and respect for the role of religion, and to see faith and spirituality as an integral part of the great human project?

In conclusion

There can be no affirmation of religious freedom without also affirming the right to freedom from religion. I believe a religious-freedom case should be made for a secular humanist option. In Norway, a strong and well-organized group, Human Etisk Forbund (Norwegian Humanist Association) brings together agnostics and atheists concerned about humanist values. They wish to offer an alternative to religious-passage rites and to religious education. This group, which outnumbers any of the free churches and which receives a per capita subsidy from the state, has increasingly sided with the free churches and the non-Christian religious communities in disputes over issues of religious freedom.

On the horizon there are signs of a new emphasis on religious freedom as both a political issue and a moral-human rights issue. But strong currents work against such an emphasis. Privatization of belief does not inspire strong engagement in the arena of religious freedom. Secularization leads to an indifferent attitude toward all religious issues. A shift from religion to religiosity may mean that organized religion evaporates into a mist of spirituality in stark contradiction to the basic understanding of religion as community life. By turning their backs to organized religion, secularization and privatization may lead to an erosion of the value of religious freedom. A virtual declaration of religion as a non-virtual reality to the post-modern human of cyberspace is more difficult to contend with than the antagonism of warring religions and competing confessions of yesterday. And the heralded “longing for religion” as a characteristic of this generation is not necessarily to be interpreted as a longing for true religious freedom for all.

The quest for religious freedom is not limited to concerns about the legal instruments for the protection of religious rights and insistence on their fair and universal application--which, of course, certainly must be given higher priority by church and state alike. It is equally important for the churches to uphold the view that religion and faith belong to the essence of being.

Christianity expresses this essence in the credo that all human beings are created in the image of God. And the affirmation of the dignity of every human being is founded in the belief that through Jesus Christ, at once divine and human, God has identified with each one of us as an image of Himself. This mystery is the source of a genuine Christian contribution to the continuing quest for religious freedom--including freedom from religion. Affirming the richness of a pluralistic society as something God-given, I believe there is lesson to be learned in and from the Nordic societies as churches and faith communities around the world come together to face the religious freedom challenges of a new millennium.

Edited from an address by Bishop Staalsett to the IRLA’s Fourth World Congress on Religious Liberty, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1997.

TOP