![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
|||||||||||||
| |
|||||||||||||||
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
||||||||
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Documents Fides et Libertas The
Journal of the International Religious Liberty Association Religious Freedom: What It Is and What It Is Not Dwain C. Epps Coordinator Commission of the Churches on International Affairs World Council of Churches Geneva Introduction In few parts of the world has the notion of freedom with respect to religion been so widely used and misused as in Central and Eastern Europe with their particular histories of church-state relations. For Communism, religion itself was a barrier to human freedom, and the influence of dominant expressions of religion in the affairs of state was a barrier to democracy and social equality. In the name of freedom Communism sought first to separate church from the state and school from the church, and soon sought to eliminate religion altogether as the opiate which blocked freedom of conscience. For the opponents of Communism, freedom--particularly religious freedom--was a key word in the struggle against totalitarianism. But Communism failed in its attempt to eliminate religion. It failed to achieve its stated aim of a form of democracy which would put the oppressed in control of their own destiny. Its notion of freedom proved to be pure ideology and led finally to its collapse. The West regarded this as a victory of its idea of freedom and now presses on to impose its own ideological concept of religious freedom, arguing as strongly for a free market of religion as it does for unrestricted access to the economic markets of the former socialist states. Thus religious liberty remains one of the most contentious political issues of the day. Communism was blind to the capacity of religion to free the human spirit. Capitalism is blinded by a narrow ideological construct of freedom of the individual and unable to understand any role for religion other than that which prevails in its own societies. Religious freedom is an essential. The question is, What concept of this fundamental human right serves the needs of, say, Central and Eastern Europe? Can a new understanding emerge which is appropriate to this context? Real answers to these questions can be given only by those who have experienced the profound impact of decades of official atheism, and who know firsthand how it has rendered religion vulnerable to all sorts of political and religious manipulation from both outside and within. So let us seize every opportunity to share what we have learned from the past and what we are now learning from the dilemmas now faced by church and society. Such experiences can be a new beginning of contextual reflection of religious liberty and the roles of the church and the state in protecting and promoting this right. The task is difficult because the context is so varied and complex. It is marked by the resurgence of fervent popular religious sentiments frozen in past cultural experiences, and the emergence of new power struggles in both religious and political spheres. The collapse of Communism unleashed old national, ethnic, and religious tensions which have deeply divided both society and the church. Religion has been used and misused. Confused thinking and narrow perceptions of religious liberty have often exacerbated all these tensions. In such a time it is necessary to consider what religious liberty is and what it is not. The right to religious freedom, like all other human rights, is based on widely accepted international norms and standards. But how is it to be understood and applied here and now? Fortunately, this is not an exercise in creatio ex nihilo. A solid foundation has already been laid by the ecumenical movement and by the Roman Catholic Church. This foundation can be built upon. The evolution of ecumenical thought on religious liberty Ecumenical concern for religious liberty has its roots in the missionary stream of the movement for church unity and cooperation. The first substantial statement was made at the 1928 Jerusalem meeting of the International Missionary Council. It appealed in particular to followers of non-Christian religions, urging them and the churches “to hold fast to faith in the unseen and eternal in the face of the growing materialism of the world; to cooperate with us against all the evils of secularism; to respect freedom of conscience so that men may confess Christ without separation from home and friends; and to discern that all the food of which men have conceived is fulfilled and secured in Jesus Christ.” The 1937 Oxford Conference on Church, State, and Community cited several freedoms as necessary conditions for the church’s fulfillment of its obligations to society: * The right to public and private worship, preaching, and teaching. * Freedom from state imposition of religious ceremonies and forms of worship. * Freedom to determine the nature of its government and the qualifications of its ministers and members. * Freedom of the individual to join the church. * The right to control the education of ministers and the right to provide religious instruction to youth. * Freedom of Christian service and missionary activity, both home and foreign. * Freedom to cooperate with other churches. * Freedom to use public facilities available to all citizens or associations as will make it possible to accomplish these ends. Joint committees on religious liberty, subsequently formed by churches in Great Britain and the United States, developed memoranda and statements for submission to governments in the months leading up to the 1945 San Francisco conference where the United Nations was to be chartered. They built on the Oxford principles and also on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s famous “Four Freedoms” enunciated in 1941, which included “the freedom of every person to worship God in his own way--everywhere in the world.” The joint committees set the right to religious liberty in the wider framework of universal human rights which, they were convinced, formed the essential basis of a new, just, and peaceful world. Dr. O. Frederick Nolde (who would subsequently be named to direct the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs formed in 1946) became the spokesperson for a group of non-governmental organization consultants to the US delegation at San Francisco. Very largely due to his effective advocacy of the positions developed by the denominations belonging to the then developing World Council of Churches, a preamble was added to the Charter expressing the determination of the “peoples of the United Nations [to] reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” A new article was added to the body of the Charter which states that a chief aim of the United Nations Organization shall be the achievement of “international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Article 1, Section 3). The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches (Amsterdam, 1948) issued a Declaration on Religious Liberty which further articulated the emerging broad consensus among its members: * Every person has the right to determine his own faith and creed. * Every person has the right to express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching and practice, and to proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social or political community. * Every person has the right to associate with others and to organize with them for religious purposes. * Every religious organization, formed or maintained by action in accordance with the rights of individual persons, has the right to determine its policies and practices for the accomplishment of its chosen purposes. The evolution of Roman Catholic thought on religious liberty In 1948, however, the Roman Catholic Church had a quite different view of religious liberty--a view articulated in 1888 by Pope Leo XIII: Justice . . . forbids, and reason itself forbids, the state to be godless, or to adopt a line of action which would end in godlessness--namely, to treat the various religions (as they call them) alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges. Since, then, the profession of one religion is necessary in the state, that religion must be professed which alone is true. But Roman Catholic thinking on this question underwent what some commentators have called a “Copernican revolution.” A century later Pope John Paul II used his 1988 World Day of Peace message to declare that [r]eligious freedom, an essential element of the dignity of every person, is a cornerstone of the structure of human rights, and for this reason an irreplaceable factor in the good of individuals and of the whole of society, as well as the personal fulfillment of each individual. It follows that the freedom of individuals and of communities to profess and practice their religion is an essential element for peaceful human existence. The essential turning point was Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem en Terris (April 11, 1963) which stated that “every human being has the right to honour God according to the dictates of an upright conscience, and the right to profess his religion privately and publicly.” Building on this profoundly new understanding, the Second Vatican Council adopted a landmark Declaration on Religious Freedom (December 7, 1965) which addressed religious liberty not as a question of “inner freedom,” but rather as an aspect of social and civic freedom.“[T]he human person has a right to religious freedom,” the Council declared. This is a right which “has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed world of God and by reason itself . . . a harmony exists between the freedom of the church and the religious freedom which is to be recognized as the right of all men and communities and to be sanctioned by constitutional law.” According to Vatican II, civil authority has no jurisdiction over religious acts: “The religious acts whereby men, in private and in public and out of a sense of personal conviction, direct their lives to God, transcend by their very nature the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs. It would clearly transgress the limits set to its power were it to presume to direct or inhibit acts that are religious.” In 1980 the Vatican further elaborated Roman Catholic principles on religious liberty in a memorandum to the Madrid follow-up of the Helsinki Accords on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The document listed elements necessary to achieve full religious liberty at all levels--personal, community, and international. But it was John Paul II’s 1988 address (cited above) that brought together the thinking of the Roman Catholic Church and that of the ecumenical movement. “Every violation of religious freedom, whether open or hidden,” the pontiff said, “does fundamental damage to the cause of peace, like violations of the other fundamental rights of the human person.” Three years later, in his 1991 World Day of Peace message, the pope made the point succinctly in this memorable phrase: “If you want peace, respect the conscience of every person.” He went on to say that “religious freedom is not merely one human right among others, . . . it is the most fundamental, since the dignity of every person has its first source in his essential relationship with God. . . . Religious freedom is the most profound expression of freedom of conscience.” The evolution of international standards The 1948 WCC Amsterdam Declaration was profoundly influential at another critical turning point in history. Following the First Assembly, Dr. Nolde proceeded to Paris where the United Nations General Assembly was considering the draft of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was his draft of the article on religious liberty which finally commended itself: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. (Article 18.) These essential elements were later incorporated, nearly verbatim, in the International Human Rights Covenants, in the several regional human rights conventions, and in the UN’s 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. While this last instrument has not yet been translated into an enforceable international convention, it nonetheless constitutes a widely accepted basis in law for implementing the rights and freedoms flowing from the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. It calls all states to take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life; [and] . . . to make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs. . . . The preamble to the 1981 Declaration affirms that “the disregard and infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind. . . .” It goes on to express the conviction that “freedom of religion and belief should also contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace, social justice and friendship among peoples and to the elimination of ideologies or practices of colonialism and racial discrimination.” Heeding this call, a number of the newly independent states formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and some Central and Eastern European nations have drawn on the Declaration in drafting new constitutions. Universality and absolutism But as defenders of freedom build upon these universal standards and the concepts developed by the World Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church, it will be useful to reflect on some of the issues which arise in the current discussion on religious liberty. One of these is the question of the universality of international human rights principles. Some hold that these standards are based on Western intellectual traditions of the Enlightenment. Thus, it is suggested, they are remnants of the age of imperialism and colonialism and therefore cannot claim universality. Others suggest that while such standards may indeed be applicable in pluralistic societies with stable and well-developed systems of jurisprudence, nations with their own cultural traditions long suppressed by colonial rule, or countries now in transition to democratic rule, cannot be expected to apply them to the letter. The answer given by the ecumenical movement has been that the principle of universality of standards is a fundamental one. The universal rule of law and the very basis of world order laid out in the United Nations Charter depend on this. Of course, universality does not mean homogeneity; the application of principles must be patterned to varying contexts. And here is a related and equally legitimate question: Is the right to religious freedom an absolute right--or can it be limited under particular circumstances? The answer given in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is clear. The right to religious freedom and the other enunciated human rights may be limited only “for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” Many Christians, however, have argued that religious liberty is a special case for absolutism. In a 1977 address, former WCC General Secretary Philip Potter remarked that “[j]ust as theology was long considered the ‘Queen of the Sciences,’ religious liberty was in the early years of the World Council of Churches a sort of ‘Prince of Human Rights.’” In the ecumenical movement, human rights thinking emerged from the missionary concern that all barriers to the propagation of the gospel must be removed. The individual’s freedom to hold or to change his or her faith, to persuade others, and to decide freely on the religious education of one’s children lay at the very heart of the gospel message. The predominant theological and juridical view held religious liberty as the very cornerstone of the edifice of human rights. Some churches today, and even some powerful states, are strongly reasserting such an absolutist view of religious freedom. The U.S. Congress passed legislation which requires a determination to be made about other states’ respect for the right to religious freedom. Countries judged to be in violation of standards defined by American law may have their diplomatic recognition withdrawn or trade or other sanctions applied against them. But ecumenical social thought with respect to religious freedom has never been so narrow. The Amsterdam Declaration of 1948 emphasized the right to religious liberty, but at the same time it called for the elaboration of an international bill of rights to protect the rights of minorities, to eliminate racial segregation or discrimination, to guarantee freedom from arbitrary arrest, and to promote the realization of human freedom through social legislation. Respect for the right to religious freedom and for the full body of rights of which it is a part was not seen as an end in itself, but rather as the essential basis for just and peaceful international relations (see Report of Section IV: The Church and International Disorder, Official Report of the First Assembly. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1948). The Fifth Assembly of the WCC (Nairobi, 1975) restated and sharpened this longstanding conviction of the ecumenical movement: The right to religious freedom has been and continues to be a major concern of member churches and of the WCC. However, this right should never be seen as belonging exclusively to the Church. The exercise of religious freedom has not always reflected the great diversity of convictions that exist in the world. This right is inseparable from other fundamental human rights. No religious community should plead for its own religious liberty without active respect and reverence for the faith and basic human rights of others. Religious freedom should never be used to claim privileges. For the Church, this right is essential so that it can fulfill its responsibilities which arise out of the Christian faith. Central to these responsibilities is the obligation to serve the whole community. Churches and other Christian communities carry, on the basis of the Gospel, a special responsibility to express in word and deed their solidarity with those people whose human rights and fundamental freedoms are denied. (Breaking Barriers: The Official Report of the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches, p. 106. Geneva: 1975.) The responsibility for the protection of the right to religious freedom is seen therefore as a shared obligation: shared between church and state, among the churches themselves, between the individual Christian and his or her church, and among Christians and people of other faiths. Today we might go further still: The responsibility for the realization of this right is one shared among ethnic and linguistic groups, among majorities and minorities, and among nations and states. The responsibility of the state The international instruments referenced above clearly spell out the obligations of the state. Government may not interfere in the affairs of the church and other religious bodies unless their actions violate the rights and freedoms of others or fail to meet the just requirements of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic society. Government may not interfere in the individual’s choice of belief or religious affiliation. It may not prohibit believers from manifesting in public or in private their religion or belief in worship, observance, and practice or teaching, either individually or in community with others. But there are many gray areas when it comes to the implementation of such principles. Much of modern thinking and practice in the field of religious liberty is based on the ideas of those who, in the late 18th century, framed the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. Thomas Jefferson wrote about a “wall of separation” between church and state. James Madison influenced the First Amendment prohibiting the establishment of religion resulting from official state recognition of any church or religious body. This was possible, even necessary, in a nation of immigrants, many of whom had fled religious persecution in Europe perpetrated by governments dominated by a majority church. In Eastern and Central Europe, some Roman Catholic and Orthodox majorities question such an absolute separation of church and state, partly out of their experience under Communist rule, and partly out of their conviction that it is they who have for centuries provided both social cohesion and protection of their peoples’ faith, language, and culture from the onslaught of foreign invaders. Some suggest that even in the US that wall of separation between religion and government has become very porous despite the fact that the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment is formally respected. Such absolute separation, it is also argued, may be possible where there is a massive body of law, custom, and practice developed over more than two centuries, something that may not be immediately achievable or even advisable in some other countries. Secularism, secularity, and religious liberty The global debate about universality of rights also criticizes the notion of religious freedom as a protection for secularism. For example, Islam complains that this has led to the erosion of spiritual values and, consequently, to a breakdown of public and personal morality, an increase of licentious behavior, and widespread social violence. In response, defenders of the secular model of the state argue that it is the only viable construct within which government can deal equitably with organized forms of religion and fully protect the freedom of conscience and belief in society. While the ecumenical movement has tended to view secularism as corrosive of fundamental religious and social values, it has nevertheless warned against equating it with the notion of the secular state, which is particularly essential for safeguarding the rights of religious and other minorities. Properly conceived and governed, the secular state guarantees equal protection under the rule of law while at the same time it upholds tradition, culture, and even shared spiritual and moral values. Religious freedom and equality under the law In many European societies churches have traditionally been major providers of education and essential medical and social services. Under socialism, virtually all of these functions were taken over by the state. After 1991 divisive debates arose with respect to the restoration to the churches of such functions and of the properties associated with them. The right to religious freedom has generally been interpreted internationally to extend to the right to own and manage property essential to the legitimate religious and social functions of the churches, and especially to equal treatment under the law of all religious groups. For this the state is to be held accountable. When it comes, however, to basic education and the determination of standards to be applied in the provision of medical and social services, religion cannot claim absolute freedom. Here again it is the responsibility of government to establish those general norms and standards which must be commonly applied to assure enjoyment of the full range of human rights to all citizens without distinction. For example, the claim of national minorities that education in their own languages is a right must be balanced against the obligation of the state to ensure the unity of the nation as a whole and to require that basic civic education be provided in a common national tongue. Religious groups also have the right to provide social services to the community. But it is the responsibility of the state to ensure that such services are accessible to all and that they are provided with respect for standards generally agreed upon. Religious groups, including minority religious groups, have the right to full and equitable participation in determining such standards and how they are to be applied. Similarly difficult and divisive issues arise with respect to state financial support or cooperation with religious organizations. The long tradition of church-state relations in Central and Eastern Europe, where the state assumed considerable responsibility for gathering and distributing funds to religious bodies or directly funded some of their activities, will continue. The degree to which this can be considered a right in the context of religious freedom is debatable. But what is unquestionable is the right to equality of treatment by all churches and religious bodies by the state. Extreme vigilance is necessary to ensure that religious bodies are not subject to infringements of their freedom as a result of undue state interference and, conversely, that government is not subjected to undue religious pressures. What is a religion--and who decides? Tradition and practice can guide church-state relations in many areas, but the matter of religious freedom and new religions moves into uncharted territory. How are new manifestations of religion in society to be viewed? What criteria are to be applied in taking decision as to which groups are considered authentically religious? Is it legitimate to withhold recognition of new churches or religious movements in favor of churches or religious groups with historical societal presence? Does the state have a role in protecting its citizens from proselytism by new religious organizations or other groups of foreign origin? Should the state withhold recognition from new religious movements which arise within its own borders or from schismatic groups who destabilize or disrupt historic churches or religious associations, thus threatening the cohesion and rights of society as a whole? In its 1928 Jerusalem Declaration, cited earlier, the International Missionary Council qualified its intention: “We would repudiate any symptom of a religious imperialism that would desire to impose beliefs and practices on others in order to manage their souls in their supposed interests.” The World Council of Churches has long warned against the misuse of religious freedom with respect to proselytism. The New Delhi Assembly in 1961 regretted that the behavior of some church mission bodies had destroyed the positive connotation that the word “proselytize” once carried. Proselytism, the New Delhi Assembly said, is not something different from witness, but is the corruption of witness: “Witness is corrupted when cajolery, bribery, undue pressure, or intimidation is used--subtly or openly--to bring about seeming conversion.” Since 1991, the WCC has condemned religious imperialism and proselytism in Eastern and Central Europe for its destabilizing effects on churches struggling to recover from the pain, suffering, and martyrdom of the Communist period and also because it betrays the fundamental ecumenical principles of Christian solidarity and common witness. This warning was reiterated by the Central Committee at its 1997 meeting in Geneva. Nevertheless, the principle of religious freedom must also protect new religious movements and new mission activities when they give vitality to the gospel message by making it relevant to people today and when they contribute to the renewal of the church in society. As stated at the beginning, questions related to religious liberty are complex and full of contradictions. Human rights and religious freedom are dynamic, in need of constant debate and further elaboration according to changing circumstances. The WCC is convinced that since these matters often divide churches and nations, they must be the subject of open discussion and dialogue. It is for this purpose that the ecumenical movement exists. Appropriate answers are best sought by those directly caught up in the contradictions. The role of religion in promoting religious liberty It has already been noted that responsibility for democratic governance of society in general and, in particular, the protection and the promotion of religious liberty cannot be left to the state alone. Religion, together with the whole of society, has a shared responsibility. The transition from totalitarian rule to democracy is excruciatingly difficult under any circumstance. This is as true in Central and Eastern European nations as it is in states such as Brazil and the Philippines, as well as other nations struggling to overcome the legacy of military dictatorships. But in this age of globalization with its neo-liberal ideology of the free market, it is doubly difficult. New coalitions must be forged to resist the forces which fragment the social, political, and economic aspects of society. Government and political parties cannot manage alone. The concerted efforts of government, the private sector, religion, and organizations of civil society are needed. In the field of religious liberty, churches, synagogues and temples, and mosques do bear a special responsibility. Religion a model of democracy to society It has been said that of the three related rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--the rights to freedom of thought, of conscience, and of religion--it is the second which is nearest to an absolute right, without which all other human rights fall. It is also true that the Christian church itself has been among history’s chief violators of this fundamental right. Free thought and exercise of conscience have more often been condemned as heresy than welcomed, and their advocates within the church more often punished than celebrated. Moreover, it is true that the church has more often violated the religious freedom of people than has the state. Sad indeed is the record of how dominant Christian majorities have treated people who belong to minority churches, who adhere to other faiths. Thus the heaviest burden for the ensuring of respect for the right to religious liberty falls on religion itself. To meet the challenge, people of faith must come to terms with--and confess--their own errors and shortcomings. To be credible to society as a whole, members of churches across the spectrum must ensure that this right is respected within each church and in our relationships one with another. As the Nairobi WCC Assembly stated, religious liberty is not an exclusive privilege of the church, but religious freedom is necessary for the church to be able to serve the whole community. In this respect, the churches are called to provide a model of democracy to society in their dealings with one another, showing tolerance, mutual respect, and a will to strengthen the common witness to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Majority and minority churches alike are accountable to and responsible for one another, and beyond this, to all religious bodies in society who share the right to equal treatment under law. Edited from an address by Dr. Epps to the Ecumenical Conference, Dobogoko, Hungary, 1997. |
||