PROSELYTISM, CHANGE OF RELIGION, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
by Natan Lerner

INTRODUCTION

Issues related to change of religion[1] have caused considerable controversy during the preparation of human rights instruments concerning religious rights. In fact, during the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, representatives of some states argued against any reference to an individual’s right to change religion. The controversy resurfaced during the preparation of both the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In 1981, when the penultimate draft of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief was presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations, opposition to such a reference could have prevented the unanimous acceptance of the Declaration had a compromise not been accepted. However, the issues related to change of religion have not been resolved and are likely to continue to cause great difficulties if a draft convention on religious rights is considered.

The situation is not a surprising one. Some religions do not accept the right to abandon and adopt another religion or the right to remain without a religion. In some cases, apostasy or heresy are considered crimes and are severely punished. Additionally, some states demand that individuals follow formal steps in order to change their membership in a recognized religious community or congregation and even criminalize attempts to induce other persons to change their religion or join a different religious group.

Moreover, these issues are part of the larger controversy between the universal character of modern human rights and “cultural relativism.” Spokespersons for cultural relativism argue that human rights law is strictly a Western institution and, therefore, not applicable to other cultures or societies. Accordingly, these spokespersons contend that particular cultures or religions have to be protected against external intrusions likely to disadvantage indigenous cultural or religious identity. This approach, however, clashes with the view expressed by most scholars, which stresses the universal validity of human rights.

The controversy over proselytism, conversion, teaching or dissemination of religious views, missionary activities, and related situations has recently come to the fore as a consequence of changes in international life. In Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Africa, conflicts have arisen between indigenous churches and foreign religions promoting missionary programs. In certain cases, governments have been involved in such confrontations. For example, in Latin America, the visit of Pope John Paul II in early 1996 highlighted the Catholic resentment toward Evangelical “prosperity.”[2] Additionally, in several countries, conflicts between churches have given rise to legal action, including penal measures. International judiciaries have intervened in a few instances, while in some countries, the full power of the state has been mobilized to prevent foreign churches from attempting to attract converts from the local population.

In evaluating the religious freedom legislation recently adopted in Russia in light of international human rights provisions, it seems relevant to begin by noting remarks made by President Boris Yeltsin on July 28, 1997. Yeltsin rejected the Russian law as adopted by the Duma on June 23, 1997, and stated that the law countermanded generally accepted principles of international law, such as Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (this last document has not yet been ratified by Russia). The President of the Russian Federation also used the occasion to complain that a reference to international legal acts as an integral part of Russian legislation had disappeared from the text of the federal law, which only retained the auxiliary use of the provisions of international treaties for the purpose of interpreting Russian legislation on freedom of conscience.

Following the adoption of the new Russian “compromise” law on religion of September 26, 1997,[3] Yeltsin’s July remarks may now be seen as having only an historical value. Even so, they were correct and show the extent to which domestic policies may clash with human rights law. It is, however, beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the new Russian legislation.

In 1993, the Human Rights Committee issued an important “General Comment” on this subject.[4] The Committee, which supervises the application of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, commented specifically on the question of conversion and proselytism. The Committee observed that the freedom to “have or to adopt” a religion or belief “necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including, inter alia, the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief.”[5]

The Human Rights Committee also pointed out that Article 18(2) of the ICCPR bars coercion which would impair the right to have, or to adopt, a religion or belief. Impermissible impairment includes the use (or threat) of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or nonbelievers: (i) to adhere to their current religious beliefs and congregations; (ii) to recant their religion or belief; or (iii) to convert. The Committee identified some particular policies and practices, such as those that restrict access to education, medical care, employment, or the rights to vote or participate in the conduct of public affairs guaranteed in the ICCPR as examples of illegitimate practices.

In October 1995, the Human Rights Committee, dealing with the third periodic report submitted by Morocco, expressed concern at the obstacles to the power to change one’s religion. In its report on Libya, the Committee pointed out restrictions on an individual’s right to change religion.[6] When the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) discussed the periodic report submitted by Cyprus, questions were asked regarding the “genuine equality” enjoyed by minority religions such as the Muslim community.[7] United Nations Special Rapporteurs also addressed the issue when considering individual state reports.

In April 1996, a seminar organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) on “Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of the Freedom of Religion,”[8] devoted considerable attention to the issue of change of religion or belief. As alluded to above, the international community cannot avoid formulating a coherent position on this subject, even if opponents argue that this has been settled during the evolution of international human rights and relations.

As Thomas M. Franck has aptly pointed out, “increasingly, by national law and international usage,” individuals and other entities “are being freed to design their own identities . . . by constructing the complex of loyalty references that best manifest who they want to be.”[9] While they may opt to delegate their “new legal and social empowerment to some single, ‘natural’ objective imperative,” such as the religion of their parents, they need not necessarily do so.[10] Freedom of choice is thus a paramount consideration inherent in the tension between the right to try to convince others in matters concerning religion (or in designing one’s own religious identity) and the desire to protect identification with a particular religion against any intrusion. The determination of what is legitimate, and what is illegitimate, within the parameters of that tension is of great importance in the world today.

These developments and problems are discussed in the following pages. This Article begins by addressing freedom of conscience, religion, and belief in human rights law in general. The meaning of the terms “religion” and “belief” are discussed against the background of an historical overview of the preparation of human rights instruments. Additonally, the notions of “proselytism,” “mission,” “conversion,” and similar concepts are confronted in an attempt to establish the rights and limits of each in accordance with international law. Generally, these limits are related to the existence of coercion, material enticement, and/or violation of privacy. Further, the controversies over these issues during the drafting of the main human rights instruments are summarized. Doctrinal issues, including the debate between universalism and relativism, global developments as described by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs, and the clashes between different and sometimes opposing rights, are also discussed in connection with an analysis of judicial and quasi- judicial decisions in this area. Finally, this Article concludes by assessing present trends against the background of the growing global role played by the major traditional faiths–Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Striking a balance between the right of each of these religions to disseminate their views by legitimate means, on the one hand, and the right of each religion to protect its group identity and congregational life, on the other, is obviously not an easy task. While religion remains a personal issue, most conflicts arise when there is a clash between organized religions or religious groups.

To a considerable extent, these pages constitute a descriptive synthesis of the human rights law governing these issues. However, philosophical, moral, cultural, and historical principles are also relevant. At the threshold of a new millennium, tolerance and pluralism are far from a reality in many parts of the world. Defining the exact meaning and limitations of the right to change one’s religion and to proselytize is critical to the achievement of greater toleration and pluralism.

I.     PROSELYTISM VS. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND PRIVACY

No single human right can be considered in isolation; all human rights are interconnected. There may exist tensions between various human rights. For instance, the right to proselytize, with respect to freedom of expression, might interfere with other rights equally deserving of protection. The rights proclaimed in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[11] Article 18 of the ICCPR,[12] and Articles 1 and 6 of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief[13] may be affected by coercion or through religious persons being subjected to preaching that harms their beliefs. The provisions of Article 19(1) of the ICCPR, concerning the right to hold opinions without interference, are certainly applicable to religious opinions. Religious persons may not wish to be exposed to any type of indoctrination in any form–be it oral or written. In some instances, states in which one religion prevails may grant the members of that religion certain privileges and advantages–including limitations on the proselytizing rights of other religions.[14]

In addition to infringing on the right to hold opinions without interference, proselytism and indoctrination also implicate the right to privacy as proclaimed in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration and Article 17 of the ICCPR. The need to reconcile these conflicting rights–to disseminate religious teaching, on the one hand, and to protect a religious group’s privacy, intimacy, isolation, or strong desire to defend its religious identity against any intrusion, on the other–constitutes an important consideration when attempting to establish the scope and limits of the right to proselytism.

Fernando Volio has stated that the zone of privacy “is a zone of freedom,” “a zone of isolation, a legal cloister for those qualities, wishes, projects, and life styles which each individual man, woman, or child wishes to enjoy or experience.”[15] Privacy includes not only the security of those areas protected by Article 17 of the Covenant–home, correspondence, family, honor, reputation–but also rights listed in other articles, including, “for example, the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion[, and] the right to determine the moral and religious education of one’s children.”[16]

Sometimes proselytism, protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR as the freedom to “impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,” is limited by the rights of others. This is because dissemination of information and ideas may be offensive to the religious feelings of others. For example, the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) denied the appeal of a United Kingdom conviction of a poet who depicted Jesus Christ as a homosexual. The Commission held that the artist’s freedom of expression could be restricted under Article 10(2) of the European Convention to avoid offending the religious sensitivities of others.[17] Also in Britain, an attempt to prosecute Salman Rushdie failed in 1989 when a magistrate declared that legislation on blasphemy protected only Christianity, not Islam. Therefore, the ECHR denied an appeal submitted against the decision.[18] Kevin Boyle criticizes “the continued existence of an offense protecting only the majority Christian faith in Britain . . . and its acceptance by the institutions under the ECHR as compatible with European human rights standards.”[19]

In the view of some authors, the mere fact that proselytism may annoy the targets of such activity is not a sufficient justification for restricting uninvited speech. They contend that people should be free to disseminate their views on the “true religion” and should “not be silenced merely because some people would prefer not to hear their views.” Among other things, persons should be free to deliver literature door to door.[20] However, in places where people are present by force of law–“where the listeners are a captive audience” (schools, hospitals, prisons, military installations)–the rule may be different. In classrooms, for example, where students are not permitted to leave, teachers and school officials should exert reasonable control. They should essentially try to protect both those who wish to communicate religious views and those who do not want “to be compelled to listen to a sermon.”[21]

The situation is similar in the other situations including captive audiences, where exposing the “captive” audience to proselytizing speech or literature becomes a form of coercion. European jurisprudence has confronted instances involving religious instruction in schools against the wishes of parents who oppose such indoctrination.[22] These “captive audience” cases, however, do not always involve inter- faith proselytism. In fact, sometimes religious instruction may be coercive even when the exposed group is part of the same religion.[23]

Thus, the problem of proselytism is a clash between rights. Which right should prevail in concrete situations cannot be decided in the abstract. A just solution may require striking an elusive balance. The clash between proselytism as equivalent to freedom of expression and the right to defend a group’s religious identity (coupled with the right to privacy) is an example of the delicacy of the matters involved. A free society must find ways of accommodating equally valid human rights.

The extent to which the right to proselytize is compatible with freedom of expression was the focus of the Kokkinakis case. Arcot Krishnaswami, in Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, accepted the legitimacy of restrictive measures in extreme cases.[24] As such, his “Rule 1” prohibits coercion and “improper inducements.”[25] “Principle 3,” as elaborated by the Sub-Commis-sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, refers to “material or moral coercion.”[26] As we shall see, reports of the Special Rapporteurs (appointed by the Commission on Human Rights and Sub-Commission) mention penal measures against missionary activity which have been adopted by several states. Some countries levy penalties only against material enticement, namely giving or promising material benefits as an inducement to change one’s religion.[27] In some occasions, it is difficult to draw the dividing line between legitimate proselytism and improper inducement. Thus, varying degrees of restrictive measures exist which are endorsed by different countries.

II.     CHANGE OF RELIGION AND PROSELYTISM

In order to understand how international human rights law relates to issues of conversion, apostasy, proselytism, evangelization, and missionary activities, it is necessary to clarify the contexts in which those concepts are used. Essentially, they all turn on three major questions. First, is there a basic human right, of a universal and customary legal character, to change one’s religion or belief? Second, is there a right to act so as to convince or induce other persons to change their religion or beliefs? Finally, if so, what are the limits, if any, of such a right?

Compounding the difficulty of answering these questions is the fact that the terms used in these questions have a variety of meanings; which meaning attaches generally depends on the angle of observation. Specifically, what constitutes the sacred duty of evangelization for one group may be viewed by another group as improper proselytizing.[28] Some groups consider a particular act to be a normal exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of teaching or propagating a religion or belief. At the same time, others may view the exact same act as an illegitimate intrusion into their privacy or group identity and a violation of their freedom of conscience. The common denominator, however, is religion, or, more precisely, religion or belief. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the three basic freedoms regarding religion or belief as proclaimed by modern positive human rights law–the freedoms of thought, conscience, and religion.

These three words appear in all the major human rights instruments, at the global as well as the regional levels. However, they do not have identical weight as legal notions.[29] The freedoms of thought and conscience are more philosophical categories than legal terms of art. Both freedoms belong to the most internal and intimate sphere of human existence. However, freedom of conscience can sometimes be legally violated or restricted. Freedom of thought can only be violated or affected by complicated and sophisticated means of acting upon the human mind. Sometimes the use of power emanating from public authority, as may happen under totalitarian regimes, is the only possible method of infringement of freedom of thought. To the extent that proselytizing or missionary activities constitute an intrusion into the freedoms of thought and conscience, these freedoms appropriately belong within the framework of the present study.[30]

Proselytism and related issues mainly concern freedom of religion in a strict sense. This freedom clearly includes freedom of belief, as something different from a narrow understanding of religion, and freedom from religion, understood as the right not to be coerced into accepting religious norms or behavior. The right to proselytize, and related freedoms, including the freedoms of expression, association, teaching, etc., must be interpreted in light of attempts to define religion. Unfortunately, consensus on the definition of religion does not exist.

The meaning of religion has preoccupied, among others, philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and lawyers. Consequently, a large body of literature exists on the subject. For obvious reasons, however, few have attempted to define religion and belief in strict legal terms. Religion is a complex concept, involving profound and divisive philosophical and emotional issues. Since there are pronounced differences between various religious doctrines, it seems almost impossible to draft a legal definition that would cover all of them. Legal texts and scholars have preferred to describe the ingredients of the idea of religion in general rather than conceiving theoretical definitions of religion or focusing on doctrine. The trend in modern human rights instruments, relating “religion” to “belief” (meaning the absence of religion), has complicated the definitional question even further

Some legal dictionaries attempt to define religion. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, for instance, uses the following description: “The essential elements of religion are belief in and worship of God.” Stroud adds that “religion” and “ethical principles” must not be confused, for “religion is concerned with man’s relation to God, ethics with man’s relation to man.”[31] Black’s Law Dictionary defines religion as a

[human’s] relation to Divinity, to reverence, worship, obedience and submission to mandates and precepts of supernatural or superior beings. In its broadest sense [religion] includes all forms of belief in the existence of superior beings exercising power over human beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct, [or] with future rewards and punishments . . . .[32]

These and similar definitions contain several common elements. All incorporate the recognition of the existence of a supreme being, usually called “God.” The nature and power of this being differs from one religion to another. For all religions, God has a normative function and believers are expected to follow his teachings and rules of conduct. This may include a duty to propagate these teachings and rules among others in order to persuade them to accept the teachings as true. Believers are also expected to express their religious convictions in varying forms of worship or cult. Generally, though not always, a church or other institution is established to conduct the cult or worship. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to comment more about the meaning of “God” and “religion” in general.

The authors of a collective book entitled Religion and Human Rights[33] understand “religion” to mean “a world view or set of beliefs, along with a value system and way of life embodying and expressing these beliefs.”[34] A religion so described “derives its values and practices from some authority, whether personal or non- personal, beyond, underlying, or deeply implicit in ordinary reality.”[35] Religion aspires to provide adherents with a “comprehensive understanding of the world and [to] identify the place and role of human beings and other sentient beings within the world.”[36] It also attempts to provide answers to a series of basic questions: “the origin and meaning of existence; the nature of life and death; the meaning of suffering and ways to overcome it; the nature of evil and ways to overcome it; and the ultimate destiny of human life and all life.”[37]

Judicial attempts to define religion have confronted the same difficulties mentioned above. For example, the early efforts of the United States Supreme Court stressed the relationship of humans to some Supreme Being. Since the 1940s, and more clearly since Torcaso v. Watkins,³⁸ the Court has given wider reach to the term “religion.” Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical, Cultural, and Secular Humanism have all been explicitly identified as “religious beliefs.” The United States v. Seeger[39] and Welsh v. United States[40] cases confirmed this broad approach, taking note of the diversity and radical pluralism in the United States regarding religion. In later years, the United States Supreme Court “moved in the direction of a functional definition of religion, stressing the ultimate concern of individuals. . . . The resulting bifurcated definition of religion fairly accommodates the individual’s liberty of belief within the confines of the affirmative secular state.”[41]

The nature and scope of each religious tradition determines the emphasis it places on certain aspects of existence and human behavior. However, all religions prescribe norms according to which their adherents should conduct their personal, familial, and social lives. In some cases, the norms imply a profound identification between the individual and the creed–precluding the way out and/or the way in.

“Belief” is a broader concept than “religion.” It includes religion, but is not limited to its traditional meaning. “Belief” has been defined as “[a] conviction of the truth of a proposition, existing subjectively in the mind, and induced by argument, persuasion, or proof addressed to the judgment.”[42] In United Nations instruments, the term “belief” has been adopted to cover the rights of non- religious persons such as atheists, agnostics, rationalists, and others. The debate that accompanied the inclusion of the word “belief” in such documents is instructive with respect to the political motivations behind the controversy. Arcot Krishnaswami, in order to avoid definitional difficulties, uses the phrase “religion or belief” to include various theistic creeds and also beliefs such as “agnosticism, free thought, atheism and rationalism.”[43]

Since “belief” is a broad concept, the question of the legitimacy of conversion and proselytism does not arise. The one exception may be totalitarian regimes which require full submission of the individual and of the individual’s social group to the “beliefs” of the system. Nazism, for instance, expected the German individual to identify fully with the Nazi creed in almost religious terms–this despite its nonreligious, even antireligious, character.[44] Communist and other totalitarian regimes also attempt to control the beliefs of their respective peoples.

Human rights law thus avoided defining religion, save its expansion to include “belief.” As Professor John Witte, Jr., has noted, the “capacious definition of religion at international law left it largely to individual states and individual claimants to define the boundaries of the regime of religious rights.” ⁴⁵ Unfortunately, individual legislatures “embrace a bewildering array of definitions of religion.”[46] As shown in the following pages, the system adopted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been followed by other legal texts. This “system” refers to the three basic freedoms: thought, conscience, and religion. Instead of a definition, positive human rights law contains a catalogue of rights and duties and ways of protecting them. It determines the reach and limits of rights related to religion and belief and formulates rules to regulate relations among religions, churches, the state, and individuals. Much is left to the discretion of each constitutional and legal system and to particularized judicial interpretation and legal thought. The catalogue includes the rights to change religion and to propagate religion. Discussion of these issues must occur against this framework.

The terminology related to change of religion is complicated. “Change of religion” may be the result of two different states of mind and sets of actions. First, a person may, prompted by reason or emotion, reach the conclusion that his or her religion or belief is wrong, unsatisfactory, or insufficient. The person may then decide to opt out of the religion, adopt another religion or belief, or remain without any religion. This may lead the person to change his or her public or private behavior as well. Second, a change in a person’s convictions may translate into, or require, changes in that person’s affiliation or membership in a group. This derives from the fact that religious persons are usually not isolated individuals, but rather members of a religious group, community, congregation, or church.[47] Such changes in group affiliation or membership are not always purely private and may require special formal measures in some countries and legal systems.[48]

Such changes of religion will not always be spontaneous nor merely the consequence of intellectual or emotional causes or inducement. Sometimes external factors will be of great weight, if not decisive. Such factors may be the outcome of the activities of other persons, churches, or institutions. Representatives of such groups usually try to explain their own religious views and influence people through preaching, teaching, propagating, and advocating their religious convictions. Methods of inducement can be dangerous to the mental health of the prospective proselytes, particularly if sects combine religious ideas with disturbing forms of collective or individual behavior. To avoid such results, some states have imposed restrictive legislation on proselytism–often at the initiative of certain dominant religions.

To understand the differences between illegitimate proselytism and legitimate conversion based on individual convictions and without external interference, further terminological clarifications seem necessary. It has been pointed out that “[o]ne group’s evangelization is another group’s proselytism.”[49] A distinction between “convert” and “proselyte” is specifically made by some religions. The Spanish word conversos, for instance, was used in Christian Spain and Portugal for Moorish or Jewish converts to Christianity, and sometimes for their descendants. Unlike the terms Marranos, alboraycos, or tornadizos, the term conversos had no derogatory implications.[50] The word “proselytism” later acquired a pejorative, and sometimes threatening, meaning. Proselytism has been described as a “kind of evangelistic malpractice” involving improper activities.[51] Activities are often considered illegal when they include intimidation, coercion, bribery, economic enticement, and similar practices.

As to the present meaning of the aforementioned terms, it seems useful to distinguish between definitions based on religious, legal, and more general sources. General dictionaries reflect these distinctions. Webster’s New Dictionary of Synonyms states that “convert” and “proselyte” are synonyms. ⁵² It has also been stated that:

both denote a person who has embraced another creed, opinion, or doctrine than the one he has previously accepted or adhered to. Convert commonly implies a sincere and voluntary change of belief . . . . Proselyte basically denotes a convert to another religion . . . . In general use . . . the term may suggest less a reverent or convicted and voluntary embracing than a yielding to the persuasions and urgings of another, be it an earnest missionary or zealot or someone with less praiseworthy motives.[53]

“Apostasy” means abandonment or renunciation of a religious faith.[54] The term apostasy is usually applied by members of the deserted faith to the change of one faith for another. An “apostate,” from the viewpoint of the religion, church, or group which is being abandoned, becomes a “proselyte” from the perspective of the corresponding religion, church, or group which is being joined. How “apostasy” and “apostate” are defined depends on the position of the respective churches or religions as well as on the ways or methods leading to conversion.

“Evangelization” is identified with Christian efforts to induce non- Christians to join the Christian religion. Sometimes the term is attached to the attempts of some Christian churches to obtain the adhesion of Christians belonging to other Christian churches, inducing them to change their affiliation and embrace the evangelizing group. “Mission” refers to persons commissioned by a . . . religious organization for the purpose of propagating its faith”; “missionaries” are those sent to do this.[55] In the view of groups exposed to missionary activities and opposed to them, the term “mission” has also acquired a derogatory and even threatening meaning. This Article has previously mentioned Catholic resentment regarding “Evangelical prosperity” in Latin America in recent years. “Resentment” may be too mild a description for the reaction of some religions who see their identity endangered.

Thus, the terminology concerning changes of religion is imprecise at best and is frequently accompanied by a heavy burden of suspicion or prejudice, some of which may well be justified. Even so, the drafters of individual human rights instruments desired success in incorporating the aforementioned right into the universal framework for the protection of human rights. Accordingly, they put aside preferences regarding definitions and adopted a more practical approach. On this sensitive topic, though, even this was not enough to avoid confrontations. This becomes particularly apparent in the discussion of those instruments and the history of the travaux préparatoires below.

III.     PROSELYTISM AND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED NATIONS ERA

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 18 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the most important human rights provisions concerning religion. Their relevance to the issues of change of religion, conversion, and proselytism is crucial. These articles refer to three freedoms: thought, conscience, and religion. Freedom of thought is beyond regulation. As Leo Pfeffer properly observed, there is no need for a constitutional guarantee to ensure that freedom “for, as the common- law adage has it, the devil himself knows not the thoughts of man.”[56] In general, neither states nor individuals can interfere with thoughts or beliefs, whether religious or antireligious, which are not translated into actions, behavior, or conduct.[57] These thoughts and beliefs belong to the most internal sphere of human life, and there is no way to coerce a human being to continue or abandon specific religious beliefs. Illegal and exceptional methods of acting on the human mind are beyond the scope of this discussion.

Relevant to our subject are the freedoms of conscience and religion as proclaimed in both Articles 18 and related human rights provisions. It was the incorporation of references to the right to change religion that engendered debates and clashes in United Nations bodies. This development is not surprising in light of the approach of classic international law to the issue of change of religion, either imposed or voluntary. The author has addressed the historical developments regarding this matter in a previous essay.[58] A short summary may be helpful here to understand recent difficulties.

The rule cuius regio eius religio of the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) and its coercive implications was modified by bilateral treaties in the early stages of modern international law, most notably at the 1648 peace treaty of Westphalia. Post-seventeenth century treaties often incorporated protective clauses for religion on the grounds of reciprocity. Several countries enacted democratic and liberal constitutions containing rules on freedom of religion and belief, and prohibiting forced conversions.

Between the two World Wars, an interesting development arose regarding religious rights–the minority treaties.[59] The minority treaties, rather unfairly criticized, were a scheme for the protection of national, ethnic, cultural, or religious minorities. They also contained numerous provisions concerning religious rights. This system collapsed, along with the League of Nations, at the same time that peace and democracy in Europe collapsed. One cannot assess how they would have evolved had World War II not ended it.[60] However, the entire system was discredited when the San Francisco Conference met and attempted to build a new international order based on the United Nations. The emphasis was now almost exclusively on individual rights and freedoms; group rights were suspect. Religious human rights were considered adequately protected by the general rules regarding the rights of the individual, coupled with the principle of nondiscrimination. Whenever someone’s rights were jeopardized or violated because of a group characteristic–race, religion, color, ethnic or national origin, culture, or language–the necessary remedy would result from protecting the rights of the person, on a purely individual basis, mainly by the rule of nondiscrimination.[61]

The United Nations Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) were drafted with this backdrop in mind. Despite the passage of two decades and an evolution in legal thought, the United Nations followed this system embedded in the Universal Declaration as it passed both Human Rights Covenants (on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Political and Civil Rights).

A.     The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The United Nations Charter contains very few references to religious rights and none on change of religion.[62] Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[63] however, forbids distinctions of any kind, including religion, in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration. Article 18, of decisive importance, provides that:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 26 includes a reference to “religious groups.” It contains a provision related to the subject at hand: education shall promote “understanding, tolerance and friendship among all religious groups.” Article 29, on limitations in the exercise of the proclaimed rights, is also relevant. It states that limitations on individual rights and freedoms are only those “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”

Article 18 was of great influence on the wording of the respective texts incorporated in the Covenants, in the regional treaties, and in the 1981 Declaration. As Nehemiah Robinson pointed out in his classic commentary on the Declaration, Article 18 consists of two parts: the first clause guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the second lists the specific rights included therein. This second part is not exhaustive. It contains only those rights which the United Nations thought essential to include “because their observance might not be universal at present.” ⁶⁴

Robinson indicates that freedom of thought is a very broad concept, which includes the right to profess a religion or to profess none–to believe or not to believe. This interpretation is confirmed by the use of the term “belief.” Although “freedom of thought” includes the freedoms of conscience and religion, these latter two are explicitly mentioned “in order not to leave any doubts” in the minds of the peoples of the world, as it may be deduced from the travaux préparatoires.⁶⁵ There was some opposition to the inclusion of freedom of conscience as it was not seen as a strictly legal concept at that time. The sacred and inviolable character of freedom of thought, in the words of René Cassin, was underlined by spokespersons of different legal systems.[66]

A further remark on the word “belief” may be pertinent here. Its inclusion in Article 18 and similar articles in other instruments should be interpreted strictly in connection with the term “religion.” “Belief” does not refer to beliefs of another character, whether political, cultural, scientific, or economic. While all of these deserve protection according to law, they do not belong to the sphere normally described as religion. The term “belief” was incorporated in Article 18 to protect non-religious convictions, such as atheism or agnosticism. Its meaning has been further clarified during the discussions on the different instruments dealing with religious rights.

The very difficult problem in the drafting of the Universal Declaration–again controversial when the Covenants and the 1981 Declaration were drafted–was the freedom to change one’s religion or belief, a freedom denied by some religions and states. The clause was originally opposed, but was finally adopted by a vote of twenty-seven to five, with twelve abstentions. The authors of the 1948 Declaration were aware of the many questions involving: apostasy, missionary activities, coercion and enticement, proselytism and its limits, the status of new or young religious movements struggling for recognition, and the social dangers which accrue from sects using manipulative tactics.

As early as 1948, when the Commission on Human Rights discussed the Drafting Committee’s text, the issue of conversion arose. Saudi Arabia, supported by several Muslim states, submitted an amendment to delete the words “freedom to change his religion or belief.” The Saudi spokesman claimed that the amendment’s goal was to prevent missionaries from abusing the right based on political motivations. While Egypt’s representative initially voiced reservations about the text, he ultimately voted in its favor. “By proclaiming man’s freedom to change his religion or belief,” he stated, “the Declaration would be encouraging, even though it might not be intentional, the machinations of certain missions, well known in the Orient.”[67]

The Third Committee of the General Assembly rejected all amendments. Article 18 as a whole was adopted by thirty-eight votes to three, with three abstentions. The General Assembly adopted the Declaration as a whole by forty-eight votes to zero, with eight abstentions.[68]

The law of Islam, which is positive law in several states, inspired the Muslim objections to the explicit recognition of the right to change one’s religion or belief. In Robinson’s opinion, the fact that the clause was adopted by a vote of twenty-seven to five, with twelve abstentions, evidences the “understanding that the Declaration must be universal and that this clause did not represent a specific right but was the consequence of freedom of religion and thought.”[69]

The controversy, however, was not over. Since 1948, the question of the recognition of the right to change one’s religion or belief has dominated the debate and dealings in the area of religious human rights.[70] During the General Assembly’s discussion about the respective article of the 1981 Declaration, about forty Islamic states sought to delete the explicit reference to the right to change one’s religion. Had this deletion occurred, it would have affected the validity of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration and Article 18 of the Civil and Political Covenant. At this stage, several Islamic states, including Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Syria, and Tunisia, had already ratified the Covenant without any reservation to Article 18.[71]

B.     The Krishnaswami Study

The first important United Nations document on change of religion, in the framework of a global and comprehensive study on religious rights, was Arcot Krishnaswami’s Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices (“Study”).[72] The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (“Sub- Commission”), which ordered the Study, received it in 1959. Krishnaswami based the Study on monographs prepared by eighty-six states. After considering the facts described in the monographs, he proposed a set of rules that were subsequently adopted by the Sub-Commission in a modified form and transmitted to the Commission on Human Rights, together with the entire Study.

Krishnaswami deals carefully with the issues related to change of religion. He mentions the clear distinction between freedom to maintain, or change, religion or belief, which cannot be restrained, and freedom to manifest those beliefs, already present in the writings of John Locke in 1689. Locke, whose views on toleration are not totally immune from criticism, wrote in his first Letter concerning Toleration:

No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hope of salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay there . . . . A church, then, is a society of members voluntarily united to that end.[73]

For Krishnaswami, freedom to maintain or to change religion or belief falls primarily within the domain of the inner faith and conscience of an individual. However, cases of interference with this freedom exist, as followers of most religions or beliefs are members of some form of organization or community. Compelling an individual to join an organized religion or belief, or preventing an individual from leaving, must be considered an infringement of religious human rights. Even so, admits Krishnaswami, the mere existence of rules or procedures for formally joining or leaving a religion or belief is not necessarily an infringement of those rights.

Some states consider the establishment of new religious organizations dangerous because of the impact that a religion or belief normally has upon its followers. Consequently, these states may limit the freedom to change religion. Other times, limitations are the result of social pressures, rather than of governmental action. If a dissenting group is relatively large and tries to gain converts, the predominant group may be inclined to impose restrictions. Restrictions are more likely if the predominant religion or belief sees the new group as a splinter of the predominant group or as a schism or heresy. They may also be the result of links between a minority group and co-religionists in another country.[74]

Compulsory conversion is not merely an issue of the past. In his Study, Krishnaswami mentions contemporary instances of individuals or groups thereof being pressured to convert. Such pressures range from outright persecution to minor discriminatory measures. Frequently, the public authorities simply “fail to curb sufficiently pressures which are exerted by religions or beliefs enjoying a preferential position in the State,” ⁷⁵ although it has become increasingly rare for public authorities to exert such pressure directly. Some legal systems deny formal recognition to schismatic sectors and instead continue to consider the new group as a part of the parent group. In other instances, dissenting elements are either compelled against their will to merge with the parent group or are totally denied the right to change religion or belief. Most religions clearly welcome converts formerly belonging to other faiths. The same groups reluctantly re-admit the conversion of individuals who chose to leave their religion or belief. Apostasy may be prohibited by religious law or discouraged by social ostracism. In the past, it was even severely punished by exile, excommunication, or death. Even now, state recognition of a group’s religious law as the law of the state may render a change of religion or belief legally impossible. Some states enforce the religious law of recognized communities in matters relating to personal status. In such states, an individual’s change of religion or belief may lead to certain incapacities or the loss of certain family rights. These same outcomes sometimes occur when a religious group refuses to grant a member the right to opt out.

Some states require an individual to register formally with religious or state authorities before granting legal effect to a change of religion. Sometimes, such formalities are employed to dissuade individuals from changing religions. Problems connected with religious education and with conversion of children are particularly complicated. In some countries, antenuptial agreements prevail upon the wishes of the parent or guardian. While the “best interest of the child” should be the paramount consideration, attention should also be paid to the expressed or presumed wishes of deceased or absent parents. The clash between parental authority, state policies, and the “best interest of the child” is frequently a source of difficulties, and judicial intervention is often necessary.

The methods of propagating a religion play a role as well. Determining which inducements are “improper” may be difficult. Some missionaries establish orphanages or schools, sometimes creating problems. Therefore, some countries have banned the running of educational institutions by missionaries. Similar objections have been voiced concerning other institutions managed by missionaries, including hospitals and social assistance programs. Defining the scope of “missionary activities” is difficult, particularly when such activities take place among weak or vulnerable social sectors.

Krishnaswami emphasizes that attempts to convert individuals may conflict with their freedom to maintain their own religion or belief. This conflict may cause individuals and their respective groups to resist such attempts. Such resistance may make the coexistence of faiths difficult and cause clashes due either to the contents of the message or the methods used. Such clashes may necessitate state intervention, but the state should not exceed what is needed to restore peace.[76]

Cultural factors may dictate a society’s attitude towards dissemination or propagation of a faith. Sometimes the powers which govern nonself-governing territories do not allow missionary work, even if the administering authority is of the same religion as the missionaries. This is because the activities of foreign missionaries may not be in harmony with the existing order. Krishnaswami illustrates this phenomenon by using a British Government memorandum concerning Northern Nigeria, Sudan, and Somaliland.[77] The government took the line that “since Northern Nigeria and the Sudan were Islamic countries and the indigenous rulers were unwilling to permit Christian preaching, it would be wrong for them to permit Christian missionary work until public opinion should change.” The same approach was applied to the Somaliland Protectorate.[78] Hesitancy in such cases may have been based on “the fear of the introduction of a fresh cultural impact.” With the end of classic colonialism, the above situation has virtually disappeared.

In determining appropriate limitations concerning religious propagation, states must seek to preserve social stability and national security. The goal in every case should be to avoid the imposition of undue restrictions. The state has the right to limit improper inducements, such as bribes, that instigate a change of faith which is not the result of genuine conviction. When political tensions escalate between two countries, one country may deem it necessary to curtail the work of missionaries coming from the other country. Other considerations, such as morality, the general welfare, or the protection of public health, may also necessitate limitations upon faith propagation.

Sometimes the problem is not the religious message itself, but rather the method employed which others may find offensive. This may lead to special laws, such as those that prohibit activities affecting the religious feelings of the clergy or believers of a given faith. Occasionally, such legislation may be so abusive that it permits censorship and regulation of publications and the media. However, blasphemy laws have become mostly, although not entirely, obsolete, and are generally not applied.[79] Rather, new issues have emerged in our day, including the use of computers to disseminate religious views. This problem, not obvious at the time of Krishnaswami’s work, presents an acute difficulty when the views espoused are incompatible with the legal order of a state. Regulation of this “computer proselytism” is difficult at best.

Krishnaswami concludes that the dividing line between justifiable and not- so- justifiable restraints on religious propagation is thin. “[A]lthough the right to disseminate a faith must be safeguarded, this should be done within the framework of ensuring to everyone freedom to maintain his religion or belief.” Acceptable limitations “should be such as will maintain peace and tranquility both inside and outside the country or territory, failing which no religious freedom is possible.” Certain limitations upon particular forms of dissemination are permissible “in the interest of morals as conceived by society as a whole,” but they should be temporary and removed as quickly as possible. The general and obvious rule is that everyone should be free to disseminate a religion or belief provided the actions “do not impair the right of any other individual to maintain his religion or belief.”[80]

Consistent with this approach, Krishnaswami elaborates a series of “basic rules” for the attention of governments. Rule 1 states: “Everyone should be free to adhere, or not to adhere, to a religion or belief, in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. . . . [And Rule 3 provides that:] No one should be subjected to coercion or to improper inducements likely to impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or belief.” Similarly, Rule 10 proclaims: “Everyone should be free to disseminate a religion or belief, in so far as his actions do not impair the right of any other individual to maintain his religion or belief.” Rule 16(4), on the duties of public authorities, reads: “(a) The freedom of everyone to maintain or change his religion or belief must be ensured . . . . (c) In case of a conflict between the requirements of two or more religions or beliefs, public authorities should endeavor to find a solution assuring the greatest measure of freedom to society as a whole, while giving preference to the freedom of everyone to maintain or to change his religion or belief over any practice or observance tending to restrict this freedom.”[81]

On the basis of the Krishnaswami report, the Sub- Commission produced the Draft Principles on Freedom and Non- Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices. The following principles, separated into two parts, are relevant to our subject. In Part I, “Everyone shall be free to adhere, or not to adhere, to a religion or belief, in accordance with the dictates of his conscience . . . . 3. No one shall be subjected to material or moral coercion likely to impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or belief.”[82] In Part II,

8. (a) Everyone shall be free to teach or to disseminate his religion or belief, either in public or in private. (b) No one shall be compelled to receive religious or atheistic instruction, contrary to his convictions or, in the case of children, contrary to the wishes of their parents and, when applicable, legal guardians. 9. (a) No group professing a religion or belief shall be prevented from training the personnel intending to devote themselves to the performance of its practices or observances, or from bringing teachers from abroad necessary for this purpose.[83]

The freedoms proclaimed in Part I, Krishnaswami writes, shall not be subject to any restrictions. Restrictions upon the other freedoms are only those required by morality, health, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society,[84] and should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Knowledge of Krishnaswami’s Study and the ensuing Draft Principles aids significantly in understanding the evolution of United Nations instruments respecting change of religion. The Study and Draft Principles greatly influenced future texts. Their importance is further enhanced by the fact that the Study was the first document prepared for the United Nations providing a comprehensive analysis of this delicate subject.

C.     The 1966 Covenants on Human Rights

The International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights (ICESCR and ICCPR, respectively) were adopted by Resolution 2200 A (XXI) by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966. They entered into force, respectively, on January 3, 1976 and March 23, 1976.[85] Despite the time lapse between the 1966 adoption of the Covenants and the 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration, the 1966 instruments accurately reflect the general orientation and trends that inspired the Declaration.

The most relevant provisions in the ICCPR are Articles 18, 20, and 27. Article 18 has four paragraphs. Article 18(1) generally tracks the wording of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, but is slightly different insofar as the ICCPR does not refer explicitly to the right to change one’s religion or belief. Rather, it uses milder compromise language, stemming from Muslim objections to the text and attempts to delete the clause. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan were among the states opposed to repetition of the 1948 wording. Western advocates argued that an explicit reference to the right was necessary to avoid uncertainties and prejudiced interpretations.[86]

The Saudi Arabian representative expressed concern that the original text of Article 18 might be understood as favoring missionary activities or the propagation of antireligious beliefs. Thus, he submitted an amendment to delete the words “to maintain or to change his religion or belief, and freedom.” He later withdrew his amendment and supported one submitted by Brazil and the Philippines introducing the words “to have a religion or belief of his choice” instead of “to maintain or to change his religion or belief.” Western representatives criticized this amendment for being too static and preventing more than one choice.[87] For example, the British representative proposed including the words “or to adopt” in the Brazilian- Philippine amendment. Afghanistan requested a separate vote on the British proposal; it was retained by fifty-four votes to none with fifteen abstentions. The amendment as a whole was adopted by the Third Committee by seventy votes to none with two abstentions. Article 18 as a whole was approved unanimously by the Third Committee on November 18, 1960.[88] Walkate points out that six years later the General Assembly would adopt unanimously the Covenant as a whole.[89] No reservations were entered regarding Article 18. This issue is revisited when discussing the 1981 Declaration.[90]

The final version of the Covenant, therefore, proclaims that the right of everyone to freedom of thought, conscience, and belief “shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” It seems quite clear that the text recognizes the right to change one’s religion or belief, that is, to abandon one religion and adopt a different one. The discussion during the preparation of the Covenant supports this liberal interpretation. Nevertheless, the change in language is significant and problematic–particularly in those countries where religious law is part of the state law.

Article 18(2) confirms the approach followed in Article 18(1). It states that no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. “Coercion” is not defined, but it seems reasonable to interpret it not only to mean the use of force or threats but also to include more subtle forms of illegitimate influence, such as psychological and moral pressure or material enticement. The 1981 Declaration described the notion of coercion in greater detail.

Article 18(3) deals with limitations. It must be read in conjunction with Article 4 of the Covenant which designates certain articles that cannot be derogated even in times of public emergency. Article l8, in its entirety, is included in this list.[91] Article 18(3) differs from the wording of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration; Article l8(3) permits limitations on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief only “as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” This text must be interpreted strictly, for the issue of limitations is of great sensitivity in the delicate sphere of religion.

States may only restrict manifestations of religion or religious practices. Religious ideas not translated into practices and belonging to the inner sphere of human behavior are beyond any possible restriction. So too, are the freedoms of thought and conscience beyond restriction. Relatively few limitation questions have required adjudication. Particularly complicated problems have arisen when rites, customs, and rules of behavior of specific religious groups clash with norms related to public order, health, or public morality as seen by the general society.[92] Regulation of such problems depends, of course, on the constitutional and legal framework of each country. The notion of morality is indisputably the outcome of cultural and historical factors which vary from society to society. The determination of an international minimum standard in this respect may not be acceptable to all civilizations and countries because such a minimum standard may involve indirect pressure to abandon or change some religious practices or to change religious affiliations. Thus, this issue should be discussed in the broader framework of universalism versus particularism.

In sum, limitations on religious practices are permissible in accordance with each constitutional system, but Article 18 of the ICCPR as a whole cannot be derogated even in times of public emergency according to Article 4. As Partsch indicates, “[n]o limitation whatsoever is admitted as far as the realm of personal conscience is concerned,” and such absolute freedom “applies not only to the freedom to have such convictions but also to change them and to adopt new ones.”[93] As Buergenthal points out, the Third Committee debated excluding Article 18(3) from the derogation clause, but the strict view prevailed.[94]

Article 18(4) deals with the liberty of parents and/or legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. It should be read in conjunction with Article 13(3) of the ICESCR. Proselytism and change of religion are again intimately connected to this sensitive area. The UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, the 1981 Declaration, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other international instruments also discuss this important interaction between religion and education.[95]

Since this interaction between religion and education is of recurring interest in both international and constitutional law, adjudication at the national and international levels has frequently been necessary. For example, in 1978 the Human Rights Committee dealt with an interesting complaint submitted by the Union of Free Thinkers in Finland on the issue of teaching the history of religion in public schools. The Committee opined that such instruction, if given in a “neutral and objective way” that respected the convictions of parents and guardians who do not believe in any religion, does not violate Article 18 of the Covenant.[96] The link between this issue and proselytism cannot be discussed in merely abstract terms. How can we ensure that religious instruction is objective and purely informative rather than an attempt to indoctrinate children who belong to other religious persuasions? Put differently, when does such “religious instruction” become coercive proselytism that takes advantage of the teacher’s intellectual influence? This issue can only be considered specifically; it depends significantly upon other factors concurring or counter- balancing the instruction given at school.

Finally, Articles 20 and 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are relevant to the issue of proselytism. Article 20 prohibits any advocacy of religious hatred. Article 27 reflects a restrictive approach to minority and group rights. It does not refer to proselytizing activities, but does mention the right of “persons belonging to . . . minorities” to “profess and practice their own religion.”

D.     General Comment of the Human Rights Committee

The Human Rights Committee, the body in charge of implementing the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, issued an important “General Comment” in 1993.[97] The Comment speaks to issues of proselytism and conversion and stresses that the terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Such an understanding leads to a rejection of “any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious community.”[98] This remark seems intended to avoid situations in which old, well-established religious groups enjoy more protection and rights than recently established or minority religious groups. Freedom of speech is also involved, and Article 18 should be read in conjunction with Article 19(1) of the Covenant, which sets forth the general protection of speech.

Additionally, no one should be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a particular religion or belief. Paragraph 5 of the General Comment reaffirms that the ICCPR bars any coercion which would impair the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or with atheistic views–in other words, the right to conversion. According to the Committee, “coercion” means the use or threat of physical force, penal sanctions, restrictions on access to education, medical care, employment, or other rights guaranteed by the Covenant. Again, the same protection is granted to holders of nonreligious beliefs.

The General Comment also discusses the relationship between education and the teaching of religion. Public school instruction regarding the history of religions and ethics is permitted if given in a “neutral” and “objective” manner. Public school instruction focusing on a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with the Covenant, unless the wishes of parents and guardians are protected by nondiscriminatory exemptions or alternatives. Freedom to teach a religion or belief incorporates the liberty of parents or guardians to guarantee for their children a religious and moral education in conformity with their convictions.

The Committee points out that Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, concerning limitations, should be interpreted strictly. Permissible limitations should be established by law and interpreted so as to protect the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR. Article 18(3) mentions limitations based on “morals.” The Committee examines this concept, drawing from many social, philosophical, and religious traditions. The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion (i.e. considered “official” or “traditional”) or is the majority religion should not afford it special rights or privileges. Any special privileges for members of a majority religion should be considered discriminatory.[99] Moreover, nonbelievers, members of minority religions, and adherents of religions without special state recognition should not suffer discrimination or impairment in the enjoyment of any rights under the Covenant. States should report on measures taken in this area and on the rights of minorities. They should also provide information regarding practices that may be punishable, such as blasphemy, heresy, and related matters.[100]

The 1993 General Comment summarizes the principal views of the Human Rights Committee regarding change of religion. The Committee provides additional information on change of religion in its yearly Reports.[101] When considering the periodic state reports, members of the Committee ask relevant questions and require supplementary data from state representatives on legislation and facts regarding conversion and proselytism. For example, the Committee asked Morocco to detail procedures for the recognition of religious sects and to define the meaning of terms, such as “religion of the state,” “revealed religions,” and “heretical sects.” When considering an Austrian report, the Committee discussed the status of Jehovah’s Witnesses and criminal rules concerning blasphemy. The issues of apostasy in Sudan, blasphemy in the United Kingdom, the status of non-Catholic churches in Argentina, and religious teaching in Colombia were also topics of discussion.[102]

The Committee has considered very few individual complaints or communications related to religious rights, as compared to other rights. Though a few cases have made reference to proselytism and conversion, the matter has not been directly addressed. Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has had no opportunity to address this subject. This is consistent with the indirect way in which this Covenant refers to religious rights–mainly in connection with educational and parental rights.[103]

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